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Summary  finclings
De Bonis analyzes (both theoretically and empirically)  coordination in the form of imposing a minimum tax
the international distortions  and fiscal interdependence  rate might be beneficial in some cases.
that arise because of different tax rates among a region's  *  As for taxing foreign direct investment in
countries.  developing countries, in the context  of regional North-
She also studies what happens when the countries try  South integration agreements, it is possible that
to harmonize taxes, focusing on how the countries' size  differences in the countries'  objective functions eliminate
influences results, how strategic behavior changes under  the incentive for strategic reactions. In the context of
different international tax rules, and what happens to  South-South agreements, incentives for the integrating,
relationships with countries excluded from the  capital-importing countries to compete with each other
integration process.  are determined by the kind of tax system chosen in the
Among her findings:  capital-exporting  rest of the world. In the case of
*  In the case of highly mobile factors, such as financial  exemption, competition would drive capital income tax
capital, competition involves the risk of tax rates and  rates down. In the case of a credit system, competition
revenues being brought down to extremely low levels, so  would take place only in tariffs (or other trade taxes).
some form of concerted agreement seems necessary,  What is required then is an agreement not on capital
although cooperation  need not involve tax rate  income taxes but on a common external tariff.
uniformity. But regional agreements might be ineffective  *  In the presence of migration costs or a link between
when factors can move to the rest of the world.  the tax rates on mobile and immobile factors, the
- In the case of less mobile factors, such as physical  absence of coordination does not lead to a zero tax rate
capital, competition would not yield the outcome of  on mobile factors. Borh countries' welfare can be
extremely low tax rates. Then the need for concerted  improved by imposing a minimum tax rate,  but not a
international intervention  is weaker. But international  uniform tax rate.
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As regional trading arrangements  (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges  to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate  technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking  fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the international  trade research program
of the Development Research Group of the World Bank. It has produced a number of
methodological innovations in the traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and tackled four new
areas of research: the dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment, industrial
location and migration), deep integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of
the world (including its effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy
dimensions of regionalism (e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
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This paper analyses the issue of factor income taxation in the context of regional
integration agreements. If countries remove the barriers to trade and factor movement,
taxation will distort the allocation of resources across borders. Tax uniformity would
eliminate this problem. Uniformity can be obtained either through formal agreements
(harmonization) or through competition between countries, which have an incentive
to reduce taxation on factor income to attract factors. This would create a spillover
effect and promote a downward spiraling of the tax rates. In either case, uniformity is
not necessarily an optimal outcome. In the case of tax harmonization, the tax rate at
which  equalization takes  place  might  increase  the  intra-national misallocation  of
resources  deriving from  taxation,  since it is  difficult to  find  the  efficient system
around which to harmonize and this might not be  the same for different countries.
Also when achieved through tax competition uniformity would disregard countries'
differences; tax rate would be lower than in the harmonization solution and inefficient
because of the presence of the negative externality. It seems therefore that some form
of  tax  coordination  could  be  useful  in  improving  welfare  by  internalizing  the
reciprocal  spillover effects of  taxation policy. The  discussion of the  principles of
international  taxation and  the analysis of  fiscal  policy coordination  are the main
guidelines of the paper. In particular, the conflict between the criteria of capital export
and capital import neutrality is analysed and it is shown that meeting both of them, as
obtained with fiscal harmonization, does not necessarily lead to the maximization of
global welfare; also,  it is stressed that coordination is  useful in  increasing  global
welfare only if fiscal policies of different countries are interdependent. In particular,
the interdependence can be destroyed by the presence of countries excluded by the
cooperation agreement. The findings of the paper suggest that: 1) in the case of highly
mobile factors, like financial capital, competition involves the risk of tax rates and
revenues being brought down to extremely low levels and therefore some form  of
concerted agreement appears necessary, though cooperation need not involve tax rate
uniformity. However,  regional agreements  might be  ineffective  when  factors can
move to the rest of the world. 2) In the case of less mobile factors, like physicalcapital, competition would not yield the outcome of extremely low tax rates; then, the
need for international concerted intervention is less strong;  however, international
coordination in the form of imposition of a minimum tax rate might be beneficial in
some cases. 3) As for taxation of foreign direct investment in developing countries, in
the  context  of  regional  North-South  integration  agreements,  it  is  possible  that
differences in the countries'  objective functions eliminate the incentives to strategic
reactions; in the context of South-South agreements, the incentives for the integrating,
capital importing countries to compete with each other are determined by the kind of
taxation  system chosen  in  the  capital-exporting  rest-of-the-world;  in  the  case  of
exemption, competition would drive capital income tax rates down; in the case of a
credit system, competition would take place only in the field of tariffs (or other trade
taxes) and what is required, then, is not an agreement on capital income taxation, but
on a common external tariff. 4) Finally, the appendix of the paper formally analyses
the effects of factor income taxation and of the negative externality of the tax rate
setting game in the presence of factor mobility in a two-country model. It shows that,
in the presence of migration costs or of a link between the tax rate on mobile and
immobile factors, the absence of coordination does not  lead to a  zero tax rate on
mobile factors. It is also argued that both countries' welfare can be improved by the
imposition of a minimum tax rate, but not of a uniform one.Contents
I.  Introduction
II.  Taxation and factor movement
ImI.  Capital income taxation (financial investment)
1.  Basic principles of international direct taxation
2.  Taxation and efficiency
3.  Avoiding double taxation
4.  National and global welfare maximization
5.  National and global welfare in the case of fiscal
interdependence
a. Strategic behavior and coordination with the credit
and deduction methods
b. Strategic behavior and coordination with the
residence and source principles
c. Coordination and third countries
6.  Empirical relevance of the effects of tax harmonization
IV.  Capital income taxation (foreign direct investment)
1.  Taxation and distortions
a. Theoretical background
b. Empirical evidence
2.  Distortions and competition
a. Theoretical background
b. Competition in practice
3.  Tax coordination and developing countries
a. Principles of tax coordination
b. Institutional arrangements
c. Competiton to atract foreign direct investment
V.  Conclusions and directions for further research
Appendix
BibliographyII.  Introduction
All over the  world, countries engage in regional integration. One of the
driving forces behind this development  has been the economic  benefits associated
with regional integration: liberalizing goods and factor movements, harmonizing
technological  standards,  and cooperation  in economic  policies are generally  thought
to enhance  efficiency  and thereby foster economic  development  and global welfare.
One of the questions  that has arisen  in this context  is to what degree  fiscal systems  -
comprising tax structure, tax rates, treatment of foreign income, deductibility  of
foreign-paid  taxes, etc. - need to be harmonized  to enjoy the full benefits  of regional
integration.  This concerns  both trade in goods and services,  factor movement,  as well
as foreign  direct investment.  What makes such issues relevant  in the case of regional
integration  is the existence  of distortions  or external effects deriving from taxation.
Relevant  questions  include:  Is harmonization  of indirect  taxes necessary  in a regional
trade arrangement  to avoid fiscal distortions?  Which country  should  have the right to
tax  income from factors that cross  international borders? Does  foreign direct
investment  depend  to a significant  extent upon harimonization  of its fiscal treatment?
What is the impact of regional fiscal arrangements  on countries left outside of the
agreement?
This paper concentrates  on issues of factor income taxation. The taxation
problems  dealt with here derive  from the fact that lump-sum  instruments  are generally
not available;  therefore,  taxation distorts the allocation  of resources. If countries  are
open and their tax structures  differ, there will be a misallocation  of mobile resources
across  borders.  Uniformity  of the national  tax systems  would,  of course,  eliminate  the
"international" distortion. Uniformity can be  obtained via harmonization,  i.e.  a
concerted  equalization  of tax structures  through formal agreements,  or competition
between fiscal systems, which tends to lower rates because each country has an
incentive to reduce taxation on factor income in order to attract factors within its
borders.  In fact,  in the case of perfectly  mobile  factors,  it is argued  that rates would  be
equalized  at the zero level.
5But  is  uniformity  an  optimal  outcome?  In  the  case  of  harmonization,
equalization of tax rates certainly eliminates international distortions, but the tax rate
at which equalization takes place might be an inefficient one, in the sense that intra-
national misallocations of resources increase. This  can happen because,  first, it is
difficult  to  know  the  "right"  system  around  which  to  harmonize  (Tanzi  and
Bovenberg, 1990); second, the efficient tax system is not necessarily the same for all
countries.  In  fact,  uniformity  does  not  allow  for  the  respect  of  differences  in
countries' preferences, which involves further costs. In general terms, taxation is used
to  finance  public  expenditure and  different countries  might  have different  public
expenditure needs and different available instruments to finance them. For instance,
there might be different preferences for public goods across countries; or the mix of
the private and public sectors can be different. In principle, then, countries might be
worse off as a result of harmonization. By the same reasoning, uniformity achieved
through competition would also disregard differences in countries' preferences - the
difference being that  tax rates  would  be  set  at lower  levels  than  in  the  case of
harmonization.  In  fact, in  the case of  competition,  losses  deriving from  taxation
within each country would decrease since tax rates are brought down. Tax rates might
go down too much, however, because of international spillover effects that countries
do not internalize when setting the tax rates strategically.'  It  seems therefore that
system competition cannot lead to an optimal outcome either.
Some concerted international measure appears necessary; however, rather than
being inspired by the principle of uniformity, it could follow that of coordination, in
the sense of internalizing the reciprocal spillover effects of taxation policies. In other
words, this means not exploiting the partner countries and a mutual recognition of
taxation powers.2 However, coordination at the regional level still leaves externalities
I These externalities  derive from the fact that even a government  that maximizes  its own citizens'
welfare  can enforce measures  that affect the utility of the citizens of a different  country. Since the
utility of foreigners is not taken into account when governments decide on taxation, externalities arise.
For a description and a formal treatment of these external effects see Gordon (1983).
2 The problem of eliminating the international externalities can be tackled by comparing it with the
problem  of  eliminating  externalities  between  individuals.  There  are  three  standard  solutions.
Externalities would of course not exist in the interpersonal setting if those who produce the externality,
on the one hand, and those who suffer or benefit from it, on the other hand, were the same people. In
6to and from the outside countries, which must be taken into account when looking at
the efficacy of the coordination measures undertaken by the integrating countries.
Against this  background, the paper addresses the following theoretical and
empirical issues:  the effects  of factor mobility on countries  undergoing economic
integration (section 11);  capital income taxation and the maximization of national and
global welfare (section III); the kind of regional fiscal agreements needed for foreign
direct  investment  taxation  (section  IV). Section  V  draws  the  conclusions of  the
analysis and suggests topics for empirical research. The appendix presents a formal
treatment of competition when factors have different degrees of mobility.
II.  Taxation and factor movement
This section briefly analyzes two general problems which arise in the context
of regional agreements. The first question is whether factor mobility is required in
addition  to  free trade  in  order  to  obtain  the  benefits  of  integration.  The  second
question  is  whether  factor  mobility  decreases  the  efficacy  of  redistributive
government policies.
the international  settings externalities  could be avoided by enlarging  the tax jurisdiction. Another
solution to  interindividual  externalities is  that provided by  Pigouvian taxes or subsidies. The
corresponding  measure  at the international  level could be that of preserving  national  decision  making,
but at the same  time allowing  for a system  of revenue sharing  and matching  grants (how to construct
such a system  is still  an open question).  A third  solution  is that of establishing  "property  rights"  (Coase,
1960), in this case on the tax base. The first solution corresponds  to eliminating  the externalities
through  thr assignment  of the right  to tax to a supranational  entity,  which  would  then  presumably  apply
a  unique tax in its whole jurisdiction. Uniformity,  however, brings about the problems already
mentioned  (let alone the political difficulties  of giving up national sovereignty).  The experience  of
existing federal states suggests that there are many possible degrees of  fiscal integration, not
necessarily  leading to full harmonization.  The latter two forms of eliminating  the externalities  can
instead  be considered  as forms of coordination,  in which  the concept of uniformity  is abandoned  for
that of mutual  recognition  and the establishment  of transnational  rules. Coordination  might  allow for
retaining the  maximum flexibility compatible with the  removal of tax  obstacles to  economic
integration.  Therefore  a basic  principle  of tax coordination  should  be that of neutralizing  as many  cross
border  externalities  as possible.
7Factor mobility is not always required to obtain the full benefits of integration.
From the factor price equalization theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin model it is well
known that factor prices will be equalized by trade in goods alone - provided that
factor endowments are sufficiently similar to prevent full specialization in production
- so that free trade gives a first-best solution. In a world with two factors, capital and
labour, if their proportions differ by too much to prevent specialization in production,
then mobility  of  only one  factor  (e.g. capital)  will  suffice to  ensure  factor  price
equalization and the first best allocation of resources. There is no need for mobility of
the other factor  (e.g., labor). This conclusion, however, does not hold  if there are
economies of scale or intermediate inputs in production.
There are other examples where factor movement is required to reach the full
benefits of integration. In general, factor movement is required when some situation
prevents trade from equalizing factor prices (see Mundell, 1957, and Markusen, 1983,
for some examples).
Whether factor movement is necessary or not  to obtain the full benefits  of
integration, if integration takes place, the pressing question becomes whether income
taxes should be harmonized in the integrating countries. The remainder of the paper
will concentrate on efficiency questions connected to capital movements, which are
considered to be the most mobile among production factors. Before that, however,
some distributional implications of factor mobility should be mentioned.
In  general,  freedom  of  movement  facilitates  more  efficient  allocation  of
factors. Migration, however, changes the distribution of income among immobile and
mobile factor owners (see Wildasin, 1994).
In a risky environment, mobility also  affects the distribution of the income
risk. Mobility decreases the risk of the mobile factor if income at home is uncertain
while being certain abroad, shifting the risk to the immobile factor (Wildasin,  1995a
and 1995b).
8There are other aspects of the connection between integration and government
redistributive policies. In the presence of redistributive transfers from owners of the
immobile  to  those  of  the  mobile  factor,  it  may  be  Pareto  improving  for  the
immigration region to make transfers to mobile workers of the emigration one to limit
immigration to  some maximum level (Wellisch and Wildasin,  1996; compare with
Schiff, 1994, for cases of complementarity between foreign aid and migration).
One last problem deriving from fiscal interdependence is that, if factors of
production are footloose, tax rates will be governed by the rates prevailing abroad.
However,  costs  of  factor  mobility  may provide  some  scope  for  tax  differentials
between jurisdictions; moreover, governments may be able to sustain higher levels of
taxation without eroding the tax base if those who bear the tax burden benefit from
public expenditure.
III.  Capital  income  taxation  (financial  investment)
This section analyses the effects of taxation of international capital flows in
order to draw conclusions on the need for tax harmonization at the regional level. It
first  looks  at  the  global  efficiency implications  of  taxation  to  find  a  theoretical
rationale for harmonization. Second, it contrasts the harmonization outcome with the
results of the choices that countries make when maximizing national welfare. Then, it
considers  the  possibility  and  consequences  of  strategic  behavior.  Finally,  some
empirical evidence on the sensitivity  of portfolio choices to  international tax rate
differentials is presented.
1. Basic  principles  of international  direct  taxation
When factors and factor returns cross international borders, the problem of
which country has the right of taxing them arises. Two polar principles constitute the
common  basis  of  international  taxation:  the  residence  principle  and  the  source
principle. Under the residence principle, the residence of the tax payer is the basis for
9assessing tax  liabilities:  a  country  will then  tax its  residents  uniformly  for  their
worldwide income, irrespective of the country where it has been earned; non residents
are not  taxed  for  income  earned  in  the country.  Under the  source  principle,  the
location where income originates (the location of investment, as for capital income) is
the basis for assessing tax liabilities; therefore, a country levies the tax on income
originating within its borders, irrespective of the residence of the tax payer. Residents
are not  taxed for income  earned abroad. Application of the  residence principle is
consistent with the goal of horizontal equity, according to which all incomes accruing
to an individual should be taxed in the same way: the residence principle allows for
the taxation of foreign source income within the personal income tax. Taxation on the
basis of the source principle may be justified as a charge for the use of resources of
the  country  where  the  investment  is  taking  place.  The  choice  between  the  two
principles  matters.  For  instance,  capital  importing  countries  (e.g.  developing
countries)  would  do better  under  the  source  rule,  while  capital  exporters  would
benefit from the residence one. In terms of regional equity, however, one cannot say
which principle should prevail. The choice between the two principles  also entails
different efficiency implications, as explained below.
2. Taxation and efficiency
In  a closed economy, capital income taxation drives  a wedge  between the
marginal productivity of capital and the return to the person who is financing it. This
return is the after tax rate of interest, which equals the marginal rate of substitution
between  present  and  future  consumption  in  equilibrium.  In  an  open  economy,
differential taxation induces at least one of two additional distortions 3: cross country
differences  in  intertemporal  rates  of  substitution  (under  the  residence  principle),
which cause an inefficient allocation of world savings, and cross country differences
in  marginal productivity  of capital  (under  the source  principle), which  cause  an
inefficient allocation of the world capital stock.
3 For  this  analysis  see,  for  instance,  Frenkel,  Razin  and  Sadka  (1991).
10Cross country differences in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution arise
if  taxes  are levied  according  to  the  residence  principle  at different  tax  rates  in
different countries. To  see why, consider that savers in  each country equate  their
marginal rate of substitution to the after tax interest rate. Since the residence principle
implies that the tax rate is the same irrespective of the location of investment, the
before tax returns must also be the same in equilibrium. This means that the marginal
productivity of capital will be the same in all countries. However, if countries apply
different  tax rates, the  net returns  to  savers will diverge across countries and  the
international allocation of savings will be distorted. In other words, application of the
residence principle yields: an efficient allocation of the world capital stock; for savers
within a country, indifference between channeling savings to  the home country or
abroad, since the after tax rates of return are equalized (this condition goes under the
name of capital export neutrality, or CEN); and an  inefficient allocation of world
savings.  Residence  based  taxes  are essentially taxes  on  savings.  To  avoid  them,
people could in principle move their residence to countries where taxes are lower, and
this might induce competition between countries, which are pushed to lower tax rates
in order to attract (or not to lose) tax base 4.
Cross country differences in the marginal productivity of capital will instead
arise if taxes are levied according to  the source principle at different rates across
countries. In this case, within each country the same return will be earned irrespective
of the investor's  country of residence. Since in equilibrium  economic agents must
earn the same return wherever they are channeling savings, the same net return will be
earned by residents of all countries. This means that the intertemporal marginal rates
of substitution are equal across countries. However, if tax rates differ, the before tax
interest rates will differ, i.e. the marginal productivity of capital will diverge from
country to country. Thus, the international allocation of the world stock of capital will
be inefficient. Therefore, application of the source principle at different rates across
countries implies:  an efficient  allocation of  world savings;  the same treatment  to
4 Migration  could lead to decentralized  Tiebout  types  of equilibria  and make  coordination  superfluous.
There is a vast literature,  however,  showing  that this applies  only to particular  circumstances  (see for
instance  Bewley, 1982;  Gordon,  1983).
11investors in the country irrespective of their residence (this condition is called capital
income neutrality, or CIN); and an inefficient allocation of the world capital stock.
Source  based  taxes  are  essentially  taxes  on  investment.  Therefore,  there  is  an
incentive to reallocate capital toward countries where taxes are lower.
An efficient allocation of both savings and investment, as well as CEN, and
CIN are obtained if either taxation principle is adopted but the same tax rate is chosen
in all countries. Elimination of distortions is therefore the theoretical rationale for
capital income tax harmonization. Of course, if harmonization takes place only in the
context  of  a  regional  integration  process,  with  tax  differentials  being  abolished
between a group of countries (the union), but maintained with the rest of the world,
equalities between the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and the marginal
productivity of capital will not apply at the global level. Even if it does not ensure
global efficiency, there is still a rationale for harmonization at the regional level, since
this provides neutrality within the union. This is particularly important for countries
which have high economic and financial integration, since the removal of barriers to
factor movements exposes resource allocation more directly to tax rate differentials.
The  deeper  economic  integration  is,  the  stronger  becomes  the  rationale  for  tax
harmonization. The regional dimension of tax harmonization is thus a consequence of
the regional dimension of economic integration.
3. Avoiding double taxation
Of course, when both the capital exporting and the capital importing country
raise taxes and adopt mixtures of the origin and residence principles, double taxation
of the same income may arise. This is usually eliminated by systems of tax credits or
tax deductions. To begin with, consider a world formed by two countries, home and
foreign (where foreign values are denoted by an asterisk, *). Call trd  (t*rd)  the tax rate
levied  on  residents  on  their  domestic  source  income;  t,f  (t*,f)the tax  levied  on
12residents on their foreign source income; tnd  (t*nd)  the tax levied on non residents on
domestic  source  income.  Suppose  that  the  home  country  adopts  the  residence
principle and the foreign country the source principle. When the source country offers
a  tax  credit,  the tax  paid  abroad is  deducted  from  the tax  liability  in  the  home
country 5. A deduction,  instead,  means that  taxes paid  to  the  foreign country are
subtracted from  income before  assessing the tax  liability. Therefore,  a deduction
offers a smaller relief from double taxation than a credit. Table I sumnmarizes  methods
aimed at avoiding double taxation (see also Findlay, 1988).
Table I.
Avoiding double taxation
Tax revenue for f  Tax revenue for h
1 Exemption in h  t*nd
2 Exemption in f  - trf
3 Ordinary credit  t*nd  trrmin(tf;t*nd)
4 Integral credit  t*nd  trft*nd
5 Deduction  t*  nd  trf(l-t*nd)
Notation: t stands  for the tax on one unit of return;  h stands for the home (capital  exporting)
country;  f stands  for the foreign  (capital  importing)  country.
Note  that  exemption  in  the  residence  country  or  credit  are  the  methods
included in the OECD Model tax treaty.
5 Credit  can  be partial  or full  according  to whether  it covers  the  whole  foreign  source  tax payment  or
only  a fraction  of it; usually,  if the  foreign  tax  rate  is higher  than  the  home  one,  a resident  of the home
country  does  not  receive  a refund  for  the  excess  foreign  tax.
134. National and global welfare maximization
Application of either the residence or the source principle by all countries will
eliminate international distortions under tax rate harmonization. Even without tax rate
uniformity,  double taxation would be  avoided  and  either  CEN  or CIN  would be
obtained.  The  question  to  address  at  this  point  is  whether  a  country  trying  to
maximize its own welfare would choose one of these principles. The answer is no.
Corden (1967) and Findlay (1986) show that the interest of the exporting (importing)
country is  to tax less income  from exported  (imported) capital than  income from
domestically invested capital 6. This is incompatible with both criteria of international
6 To see  this, consider  first  the situation  of a small  capital  importing  country.  Small  means  that it has no
market  power;  capital importing  means that its demand  for capital and its domestic  supply of capital
yield  an equilibrium  corresponding  to a level of the interest  rate which  is above the world one.  Import
of capital then raises domestic  welfare  since the stock of domestically  invested  capital increases  and
cheaper foreign capital replaces the domestic one. Assume that the country is trying to raise a certain
amount of revenue at a minimum deadweight loss; the only tax base is income from capital and two tax
rates can be chosen: that on income from capital owned by residents (trd) and that on income from
capital invested at home but owned by non residents (tnd). If the country taxes only income from capital
owned by residents, this tax would create a distortion by reducing the domestic supply and therefore
the stock of domestically owned capital. However, the decrease in the stock owned by residents would
be matched by an inflow of (untaxed) foreign capital and there would therefore be no distortion of the
size of  the total stock of capital.  There would however be  a  welfare loss from the  replacement of
domestic with foreign capital which can be interpreted as a reduction of the surplus of the country as a
capital producer. If the tax is then imposed on imported capital income, the size of the total stock of
capital goes down, which is a second distortion. Also, cheaper foreign capital is replaced  by more
expensive domestic one (this, however, reduces the first distortion). The country suffers a welfare loss
which can be interpreted as a decrease  in its surplus as a consumer of  capital. The size of the first
distortion is related to the difference between the tax rate on domestically owned capital and that on
foreign owned capital (trd-tnd). Which is the optimal relationship between the two rates?  To answer
this, it is useful to look at  some special cases. If the supply curve  of domestic capital is perfectly
inelastic, all revenue  can be  raised by  taxing domestically  owned capital income,  and  exempting
foreign owned capital income. This is because domestic supply will not change in this case and there
will be no welfare loss of the country as a producer of capital (producer surplus is zero in the case of
perfectly inelastic supply). If instead the demand for capital is perfectly inelastic, revenue can be raised
by taxing at the same rate income from the domestically owned and the foreign owned capital stocks
(since there can be no decrease in consumer surplus which is zero in this situation). The general case
will be between these two extremes, with trd > tnd. The reverse reasoning can be made for the capital
exporting country. Briefly, a tax on income from exported capital (t*rf) only will reduce the country
producer surplus, since capital supply will decrease and some capital invested abroad will be relocated
at home, where it earns a lower return. A tax on income from capital invested domestically (t*rd)  would
cause a reduction in the country's  consumer surplus, since capital would be relocated  abroad. This
would not happen with t*rd = t*rf. Then, the welfare loss due to the reduction in the consumer surplus
would be eliminated; however, the domestic supply of capital is reduced and there will be a loss due to
a reduction in the producer surplus. With t*rf = 0 and td > 0, there will be no loss in producer surplus,
14efficiency. One also must consider, however, the case of mixed portfolios, i.e. of a
country which  is  both  a  capital importer  and a  capital  exporter.  Then, arbitrage
possibilities  imply  that  in  equilibrium  economic  agents  are  indifferent  between
investing at home or abroad:
(1)  r (1 - trd) = r* (1 - t*nd  - tdf)  (for the residents of the home country)
(2)  r (1 - tnd - t*,f) = r* (1 - t*rd)  (for  the  residents  of  the  foreign
country). 7
If  these  equalities  were  violated,  unlimited  profits  could  be  gained  by
borrowing in the low (net of tax) interest rate country to invest in the high (net of tax)
interest rate one. For positive values of r and r*, (1) and (2) imply:
(3)  (1 - trd)(I  - t*rd)(1  - t*nd - trf)(l  - tnd - t*rf).
This condition is compatible with residence and source taxation, but also with
various  combinations  of  trd, tnd,  t*rd  and  t*nd. Therefore,  not  even  the  arbitrage
possibilities will push a country to adopt one of the neutrality criteria.
Which taxation system will a country then choose? Consider the case of the
exporting  country  taking  taxes  levied  by  the  importing  country  as  given.  The
exporting country fixes the tax rates to optimize the allocation of capital domestically
offered and takes arbitrage possibilities into account. Feldstein and Hartman (1979)
and Findlay (1986) show that the optimal rule is then the "full tax after deduction"
(i.e. source tax on exported capital is deductible from the tax base,  and trd=trf,  i.e.
there is no discrimination between internally and externally invested capital). This
rule achieves the so called "national efficiency" (NE): the marginal revenue of capital
invested abroad, net of foreign taxes (which are a cost for the country), equals the
but the consumer surplus loss will be maximized. Therefore, if domestic demand for capital is perfectly
inelastic, it will be optimal to set t*rd = t*df.  In the general case, the optimal solution will involve t*rd  >
t*rf > °.
7 See Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991).
15marginal revenue of capital invested at home (this is the gross revenue, since home
taxes are not a cost for the home country).
Though  the full taxation  after deduction  rule is  optimal  for the  exporting
country, it is not  optimal at the global level. In fact, it results in  a partial double
taxation of transborder capital income and is in contrast with both  CEN and CIN.
Moreover,  as  shown in  Bond  and  Samuelson (1989), it results  in  a reduction  of
international capital movements with respect to a "tax free" situation. 8
To sum up, maximization of national welfare will not lead a country to adopt
a taxation rule compatible with either  neutrality criteria. Therefore,  harmonization
through formal agreements seems necessary. However, one can show that uniform tax
rates  are  not  necessarily  an  optimal  solution  and  that,  even  if  some  form  of
coordination  of  national  tax  policies  would  be  beneficial,  this  need  not  entail
uniformity. This issue is addressed in the next section.
5. National  and global  welfare  in the case of fiscal  interdependence
The analysis has so far abstracted from the fact that the choice of the tax rate
made by one country can affect the choice of the other countries. In other words, there
is fiscal interdependence and countries may choose to engage in strategic behavior.
This complicates the analysis of the relationship between global and national welfare.
8 There are however  cases  in which  national  and global  welfare  are not in contrast.  Horst (1980)  shows
that some common  rules of taxation of income from international  investment  emerge in cases of
particular  conditions  of capital  supply  and demand.  While  he argues  that  these  rules should  be adopted
through  international  arrangements,  in fact they would be applied also if each country  independently
maximized  its welfare.  The first case is that of an inelastic supply in both countries.  In this case,
savings  are insensitive  to changes  in taxation.  Then one needs not fear savings  misallocation  and the
optimal tax is the one that ensures CEN; to obtain this, Horst proposes a system of full credit.
However,  in the case of perfectly  inelastic  supply,  the capital  exporting  country  would  choose  trd = trf,
while  the capital  importing  country  would  choose  t*nd  = 0. This rule ensures  CEN since  it corresponds
to the realization  of the residence  principle.  By similar  considerations,  the second  case is that of an
inelastic  demand  in both countries;  then,  taxation  is optimal  if CIN is achieved  and the source  principle
applies.  The third case is that of an inelastic  supply in the capital exporting  country  and an inelastic
demand  in the importing  country,  which  leads  to the application  of the full taxation  with  deduction  rule.
The last case is that  of an inelastic  demand  in the capital  exporting  and an inelastic  supply  in the capital
importing  country:  exemption  of international  capital  movement  should  then apply.
16a.  Strategic  behavior  and  coordination  with  the  credit  and  deduction
methods
To introduce the problems connected with strategic behavior, consider again
the effects of the "full tax after deduction" rule, i.e. double taxation and failure of
obtaining CIN and CEN. What happens if a country autonomously decides to make a
choice compatible with the residence principle and CEN and gives a credit for the
foreign tax paid? Given that the choice is unilateral, it can cause a strategic response
of the foreign country. This may increase the tax rate on imported capital income,
t*nd,  thus increasing revenue, and no allocative effect (i.e. capital flights) will take
place, since the tax is reimbursed by the other country (Caves, 1982).
Bond  and  Samuelson  (1989)  show  how  strategic  behavior  leads  to  the
elimination of trade in capital under the tax credit system. This is because, on the one
hand, the capital importing country has an incentive to set the source based tax rate at
least as high as the capital exporting country (residence based) tax rate, in order to
increase revenue. On the other hand, the capital exporting country tries to set its tax
rate above the capital importing one. The authors show that the only Nash equilibrium
will then be at tax rates which are so high as to eliminate capital movements. They
compare then the credit system to the deduction system (under which some double
taxation still remains and the capital importing country does not  necessarily try to
raise its tax rate at the capital exporting country level) and show that this yields a
Nash equilibrium with trade in capital and countries being better off than under the
tax  credit method.  Therefore, credit  is  not preferable to  deduction  as  in  Hamada
(1966).
What  happens  if countries  adopt non discriminatory taxation,  as might be
plausible  within  some  integration  agreement?  Non  discrimination  means that  the
capital exporting country is taxing the capital income of its residents at the same rate,
irrespective of whether it is invested at home or abroad (trd  = trf);  in the same way, the
capital importing country is taxing uniformly capital income earned within its borders
17by residents and non residents (t*rd =  t*nd).  Under the credit  system, the exporting
country has an incentive to  set tf  (and therefore  trd)  >  t*nd,  in order  to raise some
revenue.  However,  increasing the  tax  rate  on  capital  means  reducing  its  supply.
Therefore, there will be some level of t*nd  at which the capital exporting country is
indifferent between setting  trf  >  t*nd  or setting trf (=  trd) = 0, i.e. not to tax capital,
since the elimination of the distortion in the supply of capital will yield a gain which
is equal to that of obtaining higher revenue from the exported capital. Therefore, if
t*nd goes beyond this critical level, the tax rate of the exporting country will go to
zero. Then, the capital importing country will reduce its tax rate (since no credit  is
any longer given). But then, the capital exporting country will again set tf > t*nd,  and
so on. Once again, if the value of t*nd  beyond which it is optimal for the home country
to put tf = 0 is greater than the value of t*nd  that the foreign country would choose
with tf = 0, no Nash equilibrium is reached under the credit method.
The possibility of strategic behavior provides therefore further support to the
case for tax arrangements between countries.
b. Strategic behavior and coordination  with the residence and source
principles
Similar considerations can be made for the residence and source principles. It
can be shown that, when countries independently set their tax rates, Nash equilibria
are Pareto inferior to the cooperative ones. This derives from the fact that countries
do not take into account the externalities which arise from base usurpation and tax
burden export. Reference to two models is useful to illustrate these aspects in the case
of large (Sorensen, 1989) and small (Giovannini, 1989) economies. In both models
the government is assumed to maximize the utility of a representative individual, with
consumption  and  public  expenditures  as  arguments. Non  discrimination  between
residents and non residents applies.
For the case of large economies, Sorensen (1989) considers two  symmetric
countries. This  means that externalities will have the same sign whatever country
18undertakes the fiscal operation. Therefore, if the externalities are negative (positive)
there will be a common interest in reducing (increasing) taxation and coordination
will favor both countries. Let us consider separately the cases in which the source and
the  residence  principle  apply. Under  the  source  principle,  if  tnd  increases  (and
therefore so does trd  because of the non discrimination requirement), capital will flow
out of the home to the foreign country; the interest rate in the home country increases
(because of a partial shifting of the fiscal burden) and that  in the foreign country
decreases since supply of capital has increased. Given the larger tax base, the foreign
country will receive higher revenues (positive externality). A symmetric increase in
taxes would benefit  both  countries. In  other words,  in  the non  cooperative case,
capital  is taxed too  little and an increase in taxation would benefit  world welfare.
Under the residence principle, if tf increases, so must trd.  Savings in the home country
decrease and the interest rate increases. Therefore, capital flows to the home country
out of the foreign country, which experiences a decrease in tax base and an increase in
interest rate. The foreign country is forced to reduce government expenditure or to
increase the taxation of other factors. Given the negative externality,  coordination
would yield lower tax rates and higher welfare.
For small economies, Giovannini (1989) considers the situation of two small
countries where resources are used to purchase domestic capital or foreign assets; the
world interest rate is taken as given by the single country. Each country sets its tax
rate independently, given that chosen by the other country. While  in a cooperative
solution  the relevant  effect  of  taxation  is  that  of  decreasing  world  savings  and
investment, independent maximization  of national welfare takes other effects into
account. If the source principle is applied, the single country will consider that taxing
capital invested at home causes capital flight, and will therefore tend to practice a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy, decreasing the tax rate in order to attract foreign capital.
Since the effect of a change of the tax rates on capital outflow (which is what the
country is considering) is greater than that on world savings (which would have been
taken into account in a centralized solution), a Nash equilibrium will correspond to an
undertaxation of capital income with the underlying distortion. Under the residence
principle, the single country does not consider the effect of its taxation on investment,
19which is determined by the world interest rate, and the change in savings due to a tax
change is perceived by the single country as a change in foreign assets accumulation.
Given that the direction of the response of savings to a change in the world interest
rate is ambiguous, the externality could be positive or negative and the Nash solution
corresponds either to a too low or too high level of capital taxation.
The results of these two models show that the non cooperative solutions, both
with the source and the residence principle, are not optimal. However, there are two
cases  in which coordination would not be necessary. First, if  supply is inelastic in
both  countries and the residence principle applies, the Nash equilibrium coincides
with  the  cooperative  one,  since  changes  in  the  tax  rate  do  not  affect  savings.
Therefore there is no externality, no fiscal interdependence, and no strategic game.
Second, if demand for capital is inelastic and the source principle is applied, taxation
will  not  induce  capital  flight  and  once  again  the  non  cooperative  solution  will
coincide with the cooperative one. Another case is that of the existence of a third
country excluded  by the  agreements (see section  c below).  Another  result  of the
models  is  that,  with  identical  countries,  taxation  will  be  uniform  both  in  the
cooperative and in the non cooperative equilibrium. However, the former is preferable
under welfare considerations. This confirms that equalization of the tax rates is not
necessarily an optimal outcome, even if it certainly guarantees CEN and  CIN (see
also Appendix). One reference in the literature that also supports this is Shaw (1990),
where it is shown that harmonization at the average tax rate value can result in a level
of investment which is below the optimal one.
c. Coordination and third countries
In the context of a regional integration process, it is important to consider the
influence  of  third  countries,  which  represent  alternative  markets  with  respect  to
member states. The model in Razin and Sadka (1989), which considers the situation
of a small country facing the rest of the world, provides a basis for this analysis.
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affecting the world interest rate and that at the beginning they do not adopt a common
rule on capital income taxation. Each country aims at achieving NE and is constrained
in  its  taxation  choice  by  the  other  nation's  fiscal  instruments  and  arbitrage
possibilities  with  respect to the rest  of the world.  Compatibility between  the two
countries' choices results in
(4)  r = rw  ( 1 -tw)  = r* (1 - t*nd),
for the home country (where w indicates rest of the world variables); NE is
obtained by  the full taxation after deduction  method. As  for  the foreign country,
symmetrically:
(5)  r* = rw (  -tw) =r (I -t,d),
which implies:
(6)  r = r*
(7)  (1 - t*nd)/(l  - tnd)  =  1.
This means that gross revenues offered by the union members must be equal
and imported capital must be exempted by source taxation, i.e. t*nd  =  tnd  =  0. This is
equivalent to applying the residence  principle in  its pure  form  (exemption of non
residents income). Therefore, not only NE, but also CEN within the community will
be reached: a result of supranational efficiency is obtained as the result of a national
welfare maximization process.
Is it possible to increase welfare by coordination? The answer would be yes
(as in the models analyzed in section b) if there were fiscal interdependence. Consider
then that the crucial variable in the maximization problem is net capital exports. For
the home country, next capital exports  are the sum of exports toward  the foreign
country, Sh*, and exports toward the rest of the world, Shw, minus imports from these
21two countries, S*h  and S h.  The level of this variable is a function of the world interest
rate, which is given for the home country and for the foreign country.9 Then also Swh
increases, which brings r back to its previous level and leaves net exports unaltered.
Therefore the presence of a  third country makes the fiscal interdependence
between the community members fall  and coordination becomes superfluous. The
Nash equilibrium is non distortionary, however, since CEN is guaranteed within the
community, and  is therefore  optimal,  given the  available instruments.  This  result
suggests that in  the context  of regional  integration one should not be  too  worried
about capital income taxation since there is not much one can achieve through it. The
other  way  of  looking  at  this  result  is  that  regional  tax  agreements  must  be
complemented by agreements between the union and the rest of the world.
6. Empirical relevance of the effects of tax harmonization
When tax differentials exist among countries, tax systems can only achieve
either capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality. As already mentioned, the
first one is  achieved with  residence taxation, which  guarantees that the locational
choice of investment is not affected by tax considerations, but induces differences in
the saving propensities of economic agents in different countries. The reverse applies
to source taxation. Then, under the perspective of global welfare maximization, the
choice between the residence principle and the source principle should be dictated by
the relative magnitude of the degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption (i.e.
the interest elasticity of  savings) and of international substitutability of investment
(i.e., the elasticity of investment with respect to after tax returns).
Most empirical studies on this issue suggest that the elasticity of savings is
low (see Smith, 1990) and therefore violations of CIN should involve lower welfare
loss than violations of CEN. Then, the residence principle should be preferred. This
implies that, if the capital importing country applies a source based tax, the country of
residence must grant a credit for the foreign tax paid by the investor. However, if the
9 In fact, if the foreign  country  increases  t*nd,  S*  decreases  and r increases.
22effectiveness of tax controls (and tax compliance) remains constrained by national
borders, differentials in source tax rates will still affect portfolio compositions, capital
allocation among countries, interest yields and tax revenues. Therefore, overcoming
these differentials by harmonization of tax rates would involve financial flows among
asset categories and countries, with the magnitude of these flows depending on the
elasticity of substitution between assets. Even given the lack of empirical estimates of
these elasticities, there are indications that they might be quite high. For instance, in
October  1987 Germany announced that it would impose a  10% withholding tax on
interest income in  1989. This induced a massive financial capital outflow, certainly
eased by the proximity of tax havens like Luxembourg (the tax was removed in the
same year of  entry into force, 1989, and replaced by a different  system in  1993).
Similar effects  characterized  the removal  of the  15-20% withholding  tax on  non
residents undertaken by Canada in 1975 (see Table II).
Table  II
Balance  of payments:  portfolio  investment  (bn US $)
1987  1988  1989
Germany  -1.88  -43.80  -4.60
1974  1975  1976
Canada  1.808  4.394  8.772
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
This suggests that harmonization might lead to large and rapid portfolio shifts.
IV.  Capital  income  taxation  (foreign  direct  investment)
This  section  qualifies the  above analysis for capital  flows associated  with
foreign direct investment rather than with financial investment.
231. Taxation and distortions
For several reasons, the analysis of distortions induced by tax differentials is
more complicated in the case of direct investment because many elements of the tax
base are likely to diverge from country to country. Therefore, one cannot limit the
analysis to divergences between tax rates.
a. Theoretical background
The analysis of  tax neutrality must  be  qualified when direct  investment is
concerned.
The first qualification concerns the case of individuals investing in shares. A
resident  of  one  country (individual or  legal  person)  can buy  shares of  a  foreign
company  and  a  triple  taxation  of  dividends can  arise  (corporate tax,  source  and
residence  based  personal  income  taxes). International  conventions  do  not  always
solve the problem since tax credit for corporation taxes is usually limited to domestic
dividends.
The second qualification concerns corporations that have shares of a foreign
company. In the limiting case of a parent and a subsidiary, the latter can finance itself
in four ways: self financing, issue of debt, issue of shares, and issue of debt with the
parent. In this situation,  in order  to achieve neutrality, one  needs CEN,  CIN, and
absence of distortion in the cost of capital and investment financing. Three conditions
for this are elaborated in Keen (1991). The first condition is the application of the
residence  principle,  but  must  take  into  account  the  problem  of  deferral,  i.e. the
provision by which foreign source income is taxed in the residence country not upon
its  earning, but upon its repatriation. This  makes the choice of investment depend
upon the comparison between net returns, as under the source rule (Hartman, 1985)10.
10  Some countries  (e.g. the USA) adopt the residence  principle with a credit given for foreign taxes
(limited  to the home tax liability)  and defer taxation  on foreign  source income until its repatriation.
Then, if the foreign  subsidiary  has a dollar and intends  to reinvest  it abroad,  simultaneous  repatriation
24The  second  condition  is  that  the  definition  of  the  tax  base  must  consider:  full
deductibility of interest; coincidence between tax depreciation schedule and economic
depreciation;  and  full  tax  credit  for  dividends  with  no  discrimination  between
domestic  and foreign ones. The third  condition is  equality between  corporate tax
rates.
Therefore,  the  achievement of  tax  neutrality requires  the  fulfillment  of  a
higher number of conditions than in the case of portfolio investment and the need for
some formal arrangement between countries seems to be even more necessary. Before
drawing this conclusion, however, one must see how differences in taxation actually
affect the decisions of economic agents in practice.
of profits  and direct  investment  through  funds  transfer  are inferior  to the alternative  of making  no funds
transfer,  since the former  results  in an unnecessary  tax payment  to the home country.  Hartman  (1995)
argues  that one should  differentiate  between  two types of foreign  operations:  the "new"  ones, in which
case the source  of internal  funds is a transfer  from the parent,  and the "mature"  ones,  in which  case the
source  of funds is a reduction  in dividends  payments  to the parent.  In the situation  in which  investment
is financed  by capital transfers  from the parent  to the subsidiary,  it can be shown  that the effective  tax
rate on the operation  is a weighted  average  of the home and foreign  country  tax rates,  with the exact
value  depending  on the timing  of the deferred  tax payment.  Suppose,  instead,  that a foreign  subsidiary
has one dollar of after foreign  tax earnings  which  it can either invest  or repatriate  to its parent. If the
dollar  is reinvested,  the dollar  plus the one period investment  earnings  will be repatriated  at the end of
the period.  If the subsidiary  repatriates,  after investing  for the period the parent  has (1-t)(l+r')/(1-t*);
wher  r' is the net return available  at home.  If the subsidiary  reinvests,  at the end of the period  the parent
receives  (  Therefore,  the subsidiary  reinvests  if r*(1-t*)>r',  which  means that the
domestic  tax applied  to foreign source  income plays no role in the firm investment  decision.  In fact,
since  the potential  foreign  direct investment  is to be financed  out of foreign  subsidiary  earnings,  which
will currently  or in the future bear  the same  home country  tax liability,  the only  question  for the firm is
in which location  those earnings  could be invested  to produce the highest  net return. A tax increase
would  immediately  lower the value to the parent  firm of the future subsidiary  earnings,  but would  do
nothing to alter future decisions. Only for firms with immature foreign operations (i.e. requiring
transfers from the parent) is the home country tax a  deterrent to  investment.  Keen (1991) has
questioned  the Hartmann  (1985) result (which  is similar  to that in Sinn, 1984)  on the ground that it is
based on the assumption  of independent  profitability,  i.e. that local sales can only come from local
production.  Integration  of goods markets,  instead,  establishes  a direct link between  the profits of a
parent and a subsidiary  producing  the same good, since the common  price at which  they sell it will
depend  on the production  conditions  of both of them. Therefore,  under a system  of partial  credit with
deferral, a sufficiently  large fall in the rate of corporation  tax at home will always reduce the
attractivness  of retention  financed  investment  for the mature  subsidiary.  Also, change  in the form of
double  taxation  relief will also  affect the investment  behaviour:  a change  to deduction  without  deferral
would  encourage  investment  at home while  discouraging  it abroad.
25b. Empirical  evidence
There is not  much empirical evidence on the cross-border effects of direct
investment taxation. An OECD (1991) study uses a model developed by King and
Fullerton (1984) and extended by Crooks, Devereaux, Pearson and Wookey (1989) to
compute effective tax rates on transnational investment. This allows one to assess the
degree of respect or violation of CEN and CIN (comparing the differential between
effective  tax rates faced by  a firm investing in  different countries  or by firms  of
different residence investing in the same country). The study provides evidence of the
existence of  substantial differentials according to  the country where  investment is
located or according to the residence of the firm undertaking the investment.
But the simple existence of these differentials does not imply that companies
actually change their behavior because of it. However, some evidence in this direction
can be found in the replies to a survey conducted on behalf of the Ruding Committee
(1992) among EC and EFTA companies. As far as production plants are concerned, to
the question "how often are taxes faced in alternative locations a factor in the decision
in  which country to  locate investment?", 22% answered "always",  26% "usually",
33% "sometimes" and  19% "never"" 1. This gives some evidence of the absence of
CEN. Further evidence is supplied by Devereaux and Pearson (1989) for withholding
taxes levied by countries on profits  if companies choose  to  send them out  of the
source country. They found that this  kind  of tax has  a large  distortionary impact
relative to the amount of revenue they raise. Abolition of these taxes was estimated to
bring a possible reduction of the distortions of the location of investment in the EC by
up to one third. These are large numbers, which make the elimination of the distortion
an important issue.
Another study referring to the European integration process is that by de la
Fuente  and  Gardner  (1990)  (for  the  main  stages  in  the  EC  corporate  tax
harmonization process, see Box 1). They compute the tax wedges between the pre-tax
return to the company and the post tax return to a shareholder along the King and
11  The replies from firms located  in important  financial  service centers showed  a larger relevance  of
the tax factor:  52%  answered  "always",  26% "usually",  13%  "sometimes"  and  9% "never".
26Fullerton (1984) model lines. They find relevant tax wedge differentials in the EC and
show that corporate tax base harmonization would reduce them very significantly.
However, the efficiency gains for the Community as a whole would be very modest.
The effects for individual countries would instead be quite relevant. The larger winner
would be Germany, with a 15% increase in its share of the EC capital stock, while the
largest losers would be Ireland and Luxembourg, with a 17 and 15% reduction in their
shares respectively. As for the effects on the rest of the world, they derive from the
fact that in their model the average tax wedge declines as a result of harmonization.
Then,  the  demand  for capital  rises,  and  so does  the interest  rate.  This  forces  a
reallocation of capital from the USA and Japan toward the EC.
27Box 1. Corporate tax harmonization in the EU. The situation of the corporate tax in the EU, to
take one example, is far from achieving the neutrality conditions elaborated in the literature. In that
case, one problem of the harmonization process is that the aim of "international" neutrality is mixed
up with that of the neutrality of the corporation tax itself. Limiting the analysis to the aspects that
are  not purely  "national", the  main  interaction  between  the fiscal  and  the  economnic  aspects  is
perhaps that concerning the double taxation of dividends. One can speak  of a double taxation  of
dividends in two cases: a) with respect to the personal income tax, since dividends are taxed twice,
first with the corporation tax, which hits the firm for its profits, and then with the personal income
tax, which hits the shareholder for the dividends they receive; b) with respect to the corporation tax,
since the dividends received by a corporation are included in its taxable income. In the first case, the
double taxation can be reduced by adopting a lower corporate tax rate to distributed than to  non
distributed profits (split rate system); or by giving a tax credit to the shareholder (the credit is first
summed to the dividend to compute the taxable income and then subtracted from the amount of the
tax).  If the  integration of the personal and  corporate taxes takes  place at  the corporate  level by
adoption of the split rate system, CIN would be easily reached through harmonization, even if there
is the problem of finding the rate for profits distributed to a foreign parent by a subsidiary (Di Majo,
1992). If one chooses the shareholder level, the dividend exemption system is a problem because it
cannot include a credit  for non residents.  In the case  of a  corporation taxed  for the dividends  it
receives from another firm, there is an issue in the case of parent and subsidiary with residence in
different countries, since the solution of the problem has not been reached at the Community level
but through bilateral treaties, which can have important consequences on revenue distribution among
countries. Moreover, there are treaties also with extra EC countries that induce a "treaty shopping
effect" to exploit the fiscal opportunities deriving from them (in fact, this problem has arisen also
within the EC - take Luxembourg, for example). The Directive 90/435 proposed two methods to cut
the  knot  of bilateral  treaties  within the  Community:  a)  Exemption.  The country  of the  parent
exempts the dividends that the corporation receives  from the subsidiary; this  method can lead to
competition  among  capital  importing  countries;  b)  Imputation.  The  residence  state  taxes  the
dividends, allowing for a tax credit equal to the tax paid by the subsidiary; the subsidiary residence
state does not apply any withholding tax on distributed dividends. This method can lead to revenue
extraction: the country  of residence of the subsidiary can increase  its tax rate  as it wishes  since
credit  is  integral.  The  Ruding  Committee  Report  (1992)  presented  further  proposals  for  the
elimination of discriminatory features of the tax structure and the harmonization of the corporate tax
base, plus the setting of a minimum 30% tax rate.
28In conclusion, there is some evidence of the existence of distortions deriving
from differences in taxation; therefore, a higher degree of tax uniformity would be
beneficial.
2. Distortions and competition
This question addresses the problem of whether competition between fiscal
systems can lead to some desired degree of tax uniformity, or whether harmonization
through formal agreements is necessary.
a. Theoretical background
As already mentioned, a country's  choice of tax rate influences the decisions
of  other countries.  Consider  the case  of a  source-based corporate  tax.  To  attract
investment, countries could undercut each other. This could lead to zero tax rates and
revenues, or to  an equilibrium with  positive tax rates and revenues, which  is not
optimal since countries do not internalize the reciprocal spillover effects.
In assessing the welfare loss deriving from the presence of this externality,
one must consider that direct investment is less mobile and therefore less affected by
tax rate differentials than portfolio investment. Moreover, countries might not engage
in competition because of the presence of location specific profits, or because cutting
tax  rates  and  revenue  from  corporation  taxes  might  require  an  increase  of
distortionary taxes on less mobile factors (see Appendix for  a formal approach to
these problems).
Also, a distinction should be made between physical capital and paper profits.
Moving  paper profits  is easier than moving  physical capital, in  spite of  rules  on
transfer pricing and thin capitalization. Moreover, differences in statutory tax rates are
the basic tool to attract paper profits. Competition might then arise and push tax rates
29down.  Therefore,  some  form  of arrangement  seems  necessary  to avoid  a drop  in  tax
rates  and revenues  to an undesirable  level.  In order to attract  physical  capital,  instead,
effective  tax  rates  are  important.  These  depend  on  all  aspects  of  the  tax  structure;
while  competition  might  drive  tax  rates  down,  it is unlikely  that  it might  equalize  all
other  aspects  of  the  tax  structure.  In this  case,  competition  is  unlikely  to  bring  a
desirable  outcome,  not so much  because  it would  be too severe,  but because  it cannot
eliminate  all the distortionary  features  of taxation.  In fact,  while  tax rate  equalization
can indeed  be achieved  through  a competition  process  which  pushes  down  the higher
ones,  fulfillment  of the  other  conditions  requires  cooperation.  Harmonization  of the
corporate  tax along these  lines,  however,  would  take  away the autonomy  of the  single
countries.  Alternatives  have  been  indicated  which  would  be  compatible  with  some
degree of flexibilityl 2.
Moreover,  one  cannot  draw  conclusions  on  the need  for  coordination  without
having  an idea  of  the relevance  of externalities  in  practice.  This  is  the  topic  of the
next  section.
12 Among  these, the elimination  of deferral  and the change  of the corporate  tax base according  to the
Meade (1987) S-base cash flow logic (see Paladini, 1993). Elimination  of deferral involves some
problems.  As for individuals,  one should establish  information  flows on foreign earnings and then
choose between  the residence  principle  with the reimbursement  to the non resident of the eventual
source based tax on the one hand and full credit with reimbursement  by the resident country  on the
other  hand.  The two  criteria  differ only  in the distribution  of revenue:  capital  exporting  countries  prefer
the former, capital importing the latter. As for corporations,  the problem is overcoming  national
sovereignty.  In the case of a tax credit  to an individual  resident,  the recognition  of a foreign  country  tax
right is already  present.  In the case of firms,  the end of deferral  means  either  that the country  where  the
subsidiary  is located gives up taxation of its earnings or that the parent's country  gives full credit,
recognizing  the right of the other country.  As for the cash flow based tax, this solution  would be
compatible  with deferral.  There should then be some rule to avoid thin capitalization  (since passive
interests are a deductible  cost, while dividends  are profits by which the subsidiary  is taxed, it is
convenient  for the parent  to give a credit  to the subsidiary  rather  than increasing  its capital)  and full tax
credit should be granted.  However,  the cash flow based tax has remained  an academic  proposal.  The
last solution  is that  of adopting  a common  tax base and parameters  on the basis of which  to decide  how
to redistribute  revenues  among  different  countries.  All these solutions  imply  some  form of cooperation.
A completely  different way of achieving  efficiency  is the "federal state" solution:  this involves a
common  base and a criterion of distributing  the intakes among  countries on the basis of parameters
such as the volume  of sales, the wage bill, and the value  of assets in each member  state. The desired
degree  of integration  with  the individual  income  tax might  then be left to the single  country's choice.
30b. Competition in practice
The  empirical  study  by  de  la  Fuente  and  Gardner  (1990)  found  that  the
greatest  loser from  the  harmonization of  corporate tax rates  in the  EC  would be
Ireland.  In  fact,  this  country  has  pursued  a  policy  of  attracting  foreign  direct
investment by granting a very generous treatment to the profits of the manufacturing
sector in the form of a 10% corporate tax rate (plus other subsidies). In fact, this low
rate seems to have succeeded in attracting foreign companies: in  1983, for instance,
the foreign companies'  share of net output was 98.4% in office and data processing
equipment, 98.1% in pharmaceuticals, 86.4% in electrical engineering, and 98.0% in
industrial engineering. In  1987, foreign companies provided for  80% of non food
manufactured exports (source: OECD, 1987). As a consequence of this generous tax
treatment,  revenues  from  corporate  taxation have  been low  (see  Table  Im; for  a
comparison, note that the OECD average ratio of corporate to total tax revenue was
8% in 1988).
Table III
Corporate to total tax revenue ratio in Ireland
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
0.038  0.033  0.032  0.035  0.033  0.040  0.037  0.049  0.060  0.069
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics (1995) and author's calculations.
Therefore, undercutting has worked in attracting investment, but probably at
the cost of lower revenues. This has caused a higher tax burden on personal income
(see Table IV).
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Personal income to total tax revenue ratio in Ireland
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
0.266  0.282  0.284  0.303  0.322  0.335  0.309  0.307  0.309  0.304
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics (1995) and author's calculations.
The necessity of increasing distortionary taxes on other factors is one of the
theoretical reasons why one cannot expect tax competition to be wild in the field of
direct  investment.  Actually,  the  undercutting  strategy of  Ireland  has  not  caused
reactions from other European countries (in the period examined, the second lowest
tax rate was 34% in the United Kingdom and in France). Therefore, one should not
fear a "tax war" leading to zero rates and revenues in all integrating countries. This
result, however, might well depend on the small dimension of Ireland with respect to
the rest of the EC  and  on the fact that other EC  countries, more developed  than
Ireland, were less concerned with attracting investment than with taxation equity. It
can  therefore  be  applied  to  situations  where  a  less  developed  country  makes  a
regional  integration agreement with  more  developed  ones (so  called North-South
agreements). How would  arguments differ in  the case of developing countries, all
eager to attract foreign capital from the rest of the world, making regional integration
agreements with  each other (so called South-South agreements)? This  question is
addressed in the following section.
3. Tax coordination and developing countries
International  interactions  of  tax  systems  are  particularly  important  for
developing  countries  since  international  mobility  of  factors  may  constrain  the
possibility  of  tax  reform. This  section  analyses the  principles  that  should  guide
taxation of income from foreign direct investment and the corresponding tax systems.
It  also  provides  an  overview  of  some  institutional  arrangements  existing  at  the
regional level and argues that, in the case of the capital exporting countries granting a
32credit system, the kind of agreement needed to avoid competition in attracting foreign
direct investment is a customs union.
a. Principles of tax coordination
On  the  assumption  that  capital  inflow  is  an  advantage  for  developing
countries,  three  major  areas  of  tax  coordination  have  received  attention  in  the
literature (Gersowitz,  1987; Musgrave, 1987; Bird and Oldman, 1990; Tanzi,  1990;
Boskin and McLure, 1990; Khalidazeh-Shirazi and Shah, 1991; for capital flights see
Eaton and Gersowitz,  1984; Lessard and Williamson,  1987; Diaz,  1987; Shah and
Slemrod, 1991; Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel, 1996).
The first area is the role of incentives. The most important thing to note is that
it is the (developed) capital exporting country that controls incentives by choosing
whether to  exempt  or to  tax foreign  source income.  With  a residence  based  tax,
double taxation can be moderated by credit or deduction. With exemption or deferral,
control on incentives is transferred to the source (capital importing country), which
may then choose to apply a lower corporate rate than in the developed country and
may thus attract capital.
The  second  topic  is  that  of  incentives to  reinvestment.  Tax  arrangements
introducing a differential in favor of reinvested earnings can strike a trade off between
the need for revenue and that for capital inflow. It is necessary that the exporting
country  allows  for  exemption  or  deferral.  In  the  case  of  exemption,  developing
countries may combine a low tax on profits with a high withholding tax on remitted
earnings; also the system of tax credit with deferral induces reinvestment.
The third concern is protection against tax competition. With the residence
country granting exemption, tax sparing (i.e. it credits the normal foreign source tax
even if subsidies are granted to investors in the capital importing country) or deferral,
developing countries are induced to compete with each other for foreign capital by
33lowering their tax rates. This involves a loss of  revenue and should be avoided by
coordination of tax and incentive policies.
The following section briefly describes how institutional arrangements have
dealt with these problems.
b. Institutional arrangements
Apart  from  the  polar  cases  of  unilateral  coordination  and  federation
arrangements, there exist: 1) bilateral and multilateral treaties; 2) regional integration
arrangements.
1) Tax treaties (Patrick, 1980). International tax treaties are addressed to: a)
the assignment of specific taxes to countries of residence and source; b) the uniform
definition of the tax base; c) the division of that base between countries of source in
the case  of  multinational  corporations  owning  plants  that  contibute to  the  same
production process  in  different  countries;  d)  the limitation of  the tax  rate  in  the
country of source; e) the alleviation of double taxation burdens.
The OECD Model  tax treaty (1963) and the UN  Model treaty (1980) have
proposed provisions for multilateral acceptance. Among the issues already mentioned,
these models recognize the right to tax business profits and immovable property in
the source country. As for the division  among countries  of source  of the taxable
profits  of  multinational  corporations,  the  "separate  accounting"  method  is  now
endorsed by both the OECD and the UN (income is assigned to divisions of firms in
different countries by using traditional accounting methods and "arm length" prices).
It  should also be  noted that tax  administrations in  most  developing countries  are
poorly equipped to cope with transfer pricing issues. Some countries, especially in
Latin America, have enacted simple rules,  like minimum corporate taxes based on
turnover, use of royalty fees based on the volume of natural resources extraction, and
disallowance of deduction on equity infusions by foreign-based parents.
34As for the tax shares of foreign investment income claimed by the country of
source, there are usually limitations to business income taxes, on the basis of the non-
discrimination principle, and to withholding taxes on dividends, on the basis of the
reciprocity principle. In contrast to the OECD (1963) Model, the UN (1980) Model
has sought to address some concerns expressed by developing countries (see various
Reports of the UN group of experts between developed and developing countries).
Examples  of  these concerns  are:  the  request  of  the  extension  of  the  permanent
establishment rule (article 5 of the OECD Model), constraints on the deductibility of
intra-firm payments, and the reciprocity of withholding taxes.
2) Regional tax coordination among developing countries. Several attempts
have been made to achieve some form of tax coordination (Table V), but only few
have resulted in lasting arrangements (Salgado Penaherrera, 1980).
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Examples of Regional Integration Treaties
Regional  treaties  Year  of  Main  features  (and  source)
agreement
CACM  1958  Common  market  with  a common  external  tariff  and equalization  of
Central American Common  indirect taxes; harmonization  of  investment incentives capital
Market  income  taxes. Uniform  classification  of industries  eligible  for tax
concessions  (Gillim,  1967a).
LAFTA  (later  LAIA)  1961  Prohibition  of discriminatory  treatment  of trade and capital; no
Latin America  Free  Trade  (1980)  common  fiscal  incentives  policy;  no elimination  of double  taxation
Association  because  of involved  loss of national sovereignty;  need  for uniform
tax  incentives was recognized, but not provided for  (Gillim,
1967b;  and Organization  of American  States, 1980).
ANCOM  1969  Prevention  of double  taxation  of capital  (Ffrench-Davis,  1976).
Andean  Common  Market
(later  Andean  Subregional
Integration  Agreement)
CARICON  1973  Harmonization  of fiscal  incentives  (Musgrave,  1987).
Caribbean  Community
EAC  1967  Uniform  corporate  tax (Due  and Robson,  1967)
East African  Community
UDEAC  1966  Source based  company taxation with  apportionment system;
Central African Custom and  common  code for investment  (Due and  Robson, 1967).
Economic  Union
ECOWAS  1977  Harmonization  of industrial incentives and development  plans;
Economic  Community  of  compensation for  losses from industry relocation (Musgrave,
West  Africa States  1987).
CAEU  1961  Harmonization  of income tax; assignment  of specific taxes to
Council of Arab  Economic  source  and  residence  countries  (Musgrave,  1987).
Unity
36It has been argued that regional agreements entail a particular advantage in the
case of developing countries: if they involve constancy and credibility in tax policy,
they can provide a more stable environment for foreign direct investment (Burgess
and Stem,  1993). But  which kind  of agreement is really necessary in the field of
capital  income taxation?  The next section argues that, under  certain conditions, a
common external tariff toward the capital exporting countries is what is needed to
avoid the negative effects of competition between tax systems.
c. Competition  to attract  foreign  direct  investment
As  mentioned  above, the taxation  system chosen  by  the capital  exporting
country is what determines the incentives for competition  in the capital importing
ones. Consider a world with three countries: the home country and the partner country
(the  variables  of  which  are  denoted  by  an  asterisk,  *),  which  have  a  regional
integration agreement, and the rest of  the world  (variables denoted by superscript
"4w").  If the rest of the world chooses to exempt its residents from taxation of income
from capital invested abroad, capital will flow from the rest of the world to the home
and the partner country if rW(l  - twr)  < r(l  - t),  r* (1 - t*,), where r is the interest rate,
tr a residence based tax and ts a source based tax. The exemption system gives an
incentive to the capital importing  countries to compete in lowering the tax rate to
attract capital.
If the rest of the world chooses instead a credit system, then there will be no
incentive for the capital importing countries to set t, and t*, < tWr,  since the burden on
the foreign investor will still be twr.  Therefore, they will set their tax rates equal to
that in the capital exporting country. However, if the rest of the world allows for tax
sparing, the latter can still compete raising the subsidies they concede.
If  tax  sparing  is  not  allowed  by  the  capital  exporting  country,  the  two
developing countries cannot alter taxes and subsidies to attract foreign investment;
however,  they  can  use  trade  taxes,  e.g.  tariffs  (see  Corden,  1967)13. These  will
13 For  the  relationship  between  foreign  direct  investment  and tariffs  see Jones  (1967);  Caves  (1967);
Kemp (1969); Brecher (1983); Brecher and Findlay (1983); Bhagwati,  Brecher, Dinopoulos  and
37however be distortionary since they will alter the allocation of domestically owned
resources and of consumption. One can then consider the game between two countries
targeting  capital  inflow  and  imports  (this  derives  from  the  Jones  (1967)
decomposition  of  changes  in  real  income;  see  also  Bond,  1991). For  the  home
country, the capital inflow will depend positively on the differential between the tariff
it  imposes  and  the  tariff  imposed  by  the  partner  country;  imports  are  instead
negatively related to the tariff level (if the tariff is optimal except for the externality).
If countries do not internalize the negative effect deriving from an increase in their
own tariff on the inflow of capital to the other country, tariffs will be set too high.
Under  this  perspective,  a  trade  agreement  like  the  establishment  of  a  common
external tariff seems all that is required for developing capital importing countries to
avoid  competition  in  attracting  foreign direct  investment,  or,  in  other  words,  a
customs union agreement'4.
V.  Conclusions and directions for further research
Cross  country uniformity  of  taxes  on  income  from  mobile  factors  is  not
necessarily an optimal outcome because the tax rate around which equalization takes
place might not be the "right"  one. This is true both when this rate emerges from a
competitive process and when it derives from a formal harmonization arrangement.
With  a  competitive  process,  externalities impede  the  achievement of  an  optimal
outcome.  With  formal harmonization,  since taxation  is  used  to  achieve different
objectives in different countries, uniformity would involve costs in terms of national
preferences (moreover, there is no guarantee that the chosen commnon  rate is the most
efficient one).
Srinivasan  (1987); Winters  (1988); Bond (1991); Bhagwati,  Dinopoulos  and Wong (1992); Kim and
Wilson  (1996).
14 For the issue of factor mobility and optimal tariffs see also Wooton (1988). Richardson  (1993)
shows  that, if the external  tariff is endogenous,  a free trade area is preferrable  to a customs  union since
trade diversion  is lower  under  the former.  The reason  is that  the external  tariff will tend to be lower in a
free trade agreement,  since the country  with a comparative  disadvantage  in a good (relative to its
partner) will decrease  protection  against imports  from the rest of the world. See also Grossman  and
Helpman (1995). This result should be confronted with the incentive to increase protection deriving
from the desire of attracting foreign direct investment.
38However,  given  that  what  eventually  matters  in  the  context  of  regional
integration is that countries do not exploit each other, the principle of uniformity can
be  abandoned  for  that  of  mutual  recognition  of  taxation  power,  which  allows
countries to retain some degree of flexibility 15. Consider, for instance, the following
situation for the case of financial investment: the union countries apply the source
principle; then, equilibrium conditions will yield:
r(I - trd) = r*(l  - t*nd)
r*(l  - t*rd)=r(l  - tnd),
the non arbitrage conditions will yield:
trd >,=,<  t*nd for  r*<,=,>r for t*rd<,=,>tnd.
If interest rates are the same in  the two countries, trd must  equal  t*nd  (and
symmetrically for the foreign country), i.e. the source based tax rate on non residents
must equal their residence country tax rate on residents. Such a rule would allow the
countries to  set autonomously their tax rate, and at the same time eliminate cross
border effects. Note also that if there are more than two countries in the union, the tax
rates on non residents should discriminate according to the "internal" tax rates of the
residence  country. Then, source  principle taxation is  substantially very  similar to
residence principle taxation and one obtains CEN, not CIN (unless tax rates coincide).
The  main difference with  the residence  principle is  that the latter  allows  for the
taxation  of  capital  income  within  the personal  income  tax. This  has  a  practical
importance only if the personal tax marginal rate is much greater than the source tax
rate. Cooperation would allow governments to  set rates high enough to make this
issue unimportant. Financial investment taxation is however a field where some of the
limits  of regional integration clearly appear: if  capital is  mobile also  between the
integrating countries and the rest of the world, a more generous fiscal treatment in the
rest of the world will attract capital away from the union. Therefore, in the absence of
agreements with outside countries, regional tax coordination could be ineffective.
15 This principle also applies to the European environmental standards policy: after the failure of the
negotiations for uniform standards in preparation to the 1992 internal market, the Commission shifted
to the principle of  "mutual recognition": according to it, lawful production and sale of goods in one
member state implies free entrance into the markets of theother members. A comparable principle at
the multilateral level is that of "reciprocity" (see Winters, 1990).
39The  situation  is  somewhat  different  for  less  mobile  factors.  First,  the
constraint from the rest of the world will probably be less strong. Second, within the
union the costs of moving factors will inhibit competition to bring the outcome of
zero tax rates and revenues. This makes the case for centralized intervention less
stringent.
Some conclusions can be drawn for regional integration agrrements involving
developing  countries.  First,  the  administrative  difficulties  in  coping  with  "paper
profit" taxation suggest the adoption of simple rules, like minimum corporate taxes
based on turnover and disallowance of deduction on equity infusions by foreign based
parents, to tackle "transfer pricing" problems. Second, the role of incentives to capital
inflows  and  reinvestment  is  constrained  by  the  taxation  system  chosen  in  the
exporting  country. The methods to  avoid double taxation included  in  the OECD
Model tax treaty - exemption in the residence country and tax credit - transfer the
contol on  incentives to the developing, capital importing  country. Then,  as in the
examination of competition to attract foreign direct investment, it might be useful to
distinguish between the case of South-South and North-South agreements. In South-
South  agreements, the  integrating  countries  will  both  be  capital  importing,  and
incentives to compete with each other to attract foreign direct investment might be
very strong. However, the scope for tax competition depends on the taxation system
adopted by the capital exporting countries. In the case of a credit system, integrating
developing countries will compete by the use of tariffs rather than capital  income
taxes, and therefore the danger of competition can be avoided by the imposition of a
common external tariff, with no need for particular agreements on capital  income
taxation. In the case  of  North-South  arrangements, the  North  will be  the capital
exporting country and  the South the  capital importing  one.  In this  situation  it  is
possible that differences in the countries'  preferences (and possibly the fact that the
North accepts that the South attracts part of its tax base) mitigate strategic reactions.
Most  of  these  issues  cannot  be  appraised  without  further  empirical
investigation.  In  general,  more  research  is  needed  to  ascertain the  mobility  of
productive capital. In the context  of North-South regional  agreements, it might be
40interesting to test how differences in preferences, size and other characteristics of the
integrating countries influence the incentive for competition  and  the need for tax
coordination. In the context of South-South regional agreements, one could look for
evidence on the incidence of capital inflows on the choice of and deviations from
common external tariffs and on the choice between a free trade area and a customs
union agreement.
41Appendix
This  appendix analyses the effects  of factor  income taxation  and of the  negative
externality of the tax rate setting game in the presence of factor mobility1 6. It shows that, in
the presence of migration costs and/or of a link between the tax rate on mobile and immobile
factors, lack of coordination does not lead to a zero tax rate on mobile factors. It also argues
that the welfare of both countries can be improved by imposing a minimum tax rate, but not
by harmonization in the sense of the imposition of tax rate uniformity.
One can give a simple formal representation of the negative externality induced on
the  revenues of  the  other  member  countries  by  a  partner's  tax  rate  reduction  aimed  at
attracting mobile factors.
Consider one  country that wants to maximize its tax revenues (T). For  simplicity,
assume that the supply of the production factor is rigid and unaffected by taxation; that all
factors  produce  the  same  constant  income,  normalized  to  unity;  that  the  income tax  is
proportional, the  rate  t being  the  same  for all  income  kinds'7. L  is the  total  supply  of
"immobile" factors and, given the assumptions made above, the total income they produce; c
has  the  same  meaning  for  "mobile"  factors.  An  asterisk  *  denotes  the  corresponding
variables of a second country (the other member of the union).
If c were immobile also, the revenue maximization problem:
max T = t (L + c)  (1)
t
(where T is tax revenue, t is tax rate and L and c are the two factors)
implies that t is equal to 100%, and similarly for the second country.
16 For a more  general  analysis  of the externalities  produced  by national  fiscal  policies  see De Bonis
(1996).
17  This is a simplyfing  assumption,  which is however  justifiable  on efficiency  and equity grounds;
moreover, at  least in  some cases, with different rates, the higher one could be  eluded by  a
reclassification  of income  flows,  e.g. from labour  to capital income,  if the rate  on the latter  is lower.
42Once borders  are opened  to the  migratory flow of the  production factors,  if  one
assumes, again for the sake of simplicity, that gross income is the same in both countries and
migration is costless, mobile factors will concentrate in the country with a lower tax rate.
They can now be considered a unique entity, independently of the country of their original
residence, and be denoted by C = c + c*.
The tax revenue is no longer a function of the country tax rate only, but also of the
foreign one and problem (1) becomes:
max T (t, t*) = t B  (2)
t
B  =  L,  if: t 2t*  (3)
L + C,  if: t < t*,
which implies:
T  =  tL,  if: t 2  t*  (4)
t (L + C)  if: t < t* .
Each country will try to bring its tax rate below the foreign one. However, this will
imply a reduction in revenues from the taxation of the immobile factors, which will be the
more relevant, the  larger L  (L*)  is  with respect to  C. Therefore,  the rate  will  never be
reduced beyond the point  at which the  revenue from the immobile and  mobile factors  is
lower than that can be obtained by taxing the immobile factors with a 100% rate, i. e.:
t (C+  L) 2  L.  (5)
This provides an explanation why, even with perfect international capital mobility,
the capital income tax does not disappear, establishing a lower bound for t, beyond which the
country will not go even at the cost of loosing the mobile factors:
43t 2  L/(C+L).  (6)
Consequently, the choice of t will be the following:
t* < L/(C+L)  implies t = 100%  (7a)
t* 2 L/(C+L)  implies t < t*;  (7b)
in the same way, for the second country:
t < L*/(C+L*) implies t* = 100%  (8a)
t 2 L*/(C+L*) implies t* < t.  (8b)
Graphically, assuming that when a country undercuts its partner's rate does this by  1
percentage point, equations (2) and (3), which are the reaction functions of the two countries,





L*/(L*+C)  100% t
Fig. 1: The non existence of a competitive equilibrium.
44In this situation a non cooperative equilibrium does not exist. It would "degenerate"
in the origin for L, L* = 0, with t = t* = 0; introducing a different degree of mobility through
a  different  migration  cost  according  to  the  factor  type,  so  that  not  all  mobile  factors
necessarily end up in the same country, one obtains a Nash equilibrium in which the rate on
the mobile factor does not go to zero. Moreover, countries which are "small", in the sense
that they have a lower endowment of factor, have an advantage in the competition process,
their incentive in lowering the tax rate being greater, since what they  possibly loose as a
reduction of revenue from the immobile factors is more than compensated by the inflow of
mobile factors (see the real example of capital fleeing from Germany to Luxembourg). In the
cross-border shopping models, as in Kanbur e Keen (1993), the migration cost is given by
the product  of the  unit distance  cost  (k)  and the distance  between the  consumer and the
border (d). There are two countries which extend themselves along the interval [-1, 1), with
the border  at the origin. Population is uniformly distributed within both countries, so that
those consumers for whom
(t-t*)/k < d  (9)
shop abroad.
In the case being analyzed here, "distance" must be interpreted in terms of costs of
transaction,  activity  restructuring,  non  perfect  substitutability  of  capital  across  national
borders or ownership structures, etc., according to the kind of factor.
The country revenue maximization problem then becomes:
max  T (t, t*) = t B  (10)
t
B  =  (c - c(t-t*)/k  + L),  if: t 2  t*  (1 la)
(c + c*(t*-t)/k + L),  if: t < t*.  (1 lb)
45The solution to this problem is found by first considering the case of the country
being constrained to choose a tax rate t  2  t*, which yields:
t = (1/2)  (k (c+L)/c  + t*),  if: t* <  k (c+L)/c  (12a)
t = t*,  if: t* 2  k (c+L)/c.  (12b)
The revenues corresponding to these values are, respectively,
T = (k (c+L)/c + t*)/2)2 (c/k)  (13a)
T = t* (c+L)  (13b)
If the government is constrained to choose t < t*, one gets
t = t*,  if: t*  < k (c+L)/c*  (14a)
t = (1/2) (k (c+L)/c* + t*),  if: t*  2 k (c+L)/c*  (14b)
and therefore
T = t* (c+L)  (15a)
T = (k (c+L)/c* + t*)/2)2 (c*/k).  (15b)
One finds the optimal reply of the country as for the choice of t by comparing the
values of T for the corresponding values of t*.
For t* < min [k(c+L)/c, k(c+L)/c*], the maximum value of T is obtained for t (> t*)
= (1/2) (k (c+L)/c+t*).
For t* >Ž  max [k(c+L)/c, k(c+L)/c*], the maximum value of T is obtained for t (< t*)
= (1/2)  (k (c+L)/c*+  t*).
If c* < c, for k(c+L)/c  <  t* <  k(c+L)/c*,  one  gets t = t*.
46If c* > c, then for k(c+L)/c* < t* < k(c+L)/c, one gets that, for k (c+L)/c* < t* <
k(c+QL)/~T,  then  t is (< t*)  = (1/2)  (k (c+L)/c*  + t*); for  k(c+L)/V~c  <  t*  <  k(c+L)/c,
then t (< t*) = (1/2)(k  (c+L)/c*+t*).
Putting these results together, one obtains the solution to the revenue maximization
problem, given the foreign tax rate (i. e. the reaction function of the country): for c > c*,
t (t*) =  (1/2)  (k (c+L)/c  + t*),  t* <  k(c+L)/c  (16a)
t*,  k(c+L)/c < t* <￿ k(c+L)/c*  (16b)
(1/2) (k (c+L)/c* + t*),  t* 2  k(c+L)/c*;  (16c)
for c < c*, instead,
t (t*)  =  (1/2)  (k (c+L)/c  + t*),  t* <  k(c+L)/cc  *  (17a)
(1/2)  (k (c+L)/c*  + t*),  t* >- k(c+L)/V/c  ;  (17b)
and  symmetrically  for  the  other  country.  Note  that,  given the  link between  the
mobile  and  the  immobile factor  taxation  and  the  presence  of  costs,  at  the  competitive
equilibrium the tax rate does not go to zero.
In the case of the foreign country being relatively "big" in terms of the endowment
of mobile, i. e. c* > c, and immobile, i. e. L* > L, factors, then its tax rate will be higher than
in the home country at the Nash equilibrium position. If this were not true, i. e. for t* < t, the
equilibrium values of t and t* would be found by solving the system of equations (10) e (11):
t* = (1/2)  (k (c*+L*)/c  + t)  (18)
t = (1/2)  (k (c+L)/c  + t*),  (19)
which implies
t = (k/c) (2/3 (c+L) + 1/3 (c*+L*),  (20)
47i. e. t < k (c*+L*)/c,  which contradicts the condition by  which t* < t in the non
cooperative equilibrium.
For t* > t, the Nash solution is found by  solving the system of equations (13) and
(14):
t* = 1/2 (k (c*+L*)/c* + t)  (21)
t = (1/2) (k (c+L)/c* + t*),  (22)
i. e.:
t = (k/c*) (2/3 (c+L) + 1/3 (c*+L*))  (23)
t* = (k/c*) (2/3 (c*+L*) + 1/3 (c+L)).  (24)
If the two countries are equal to each other, one obtains t = t* = (k/c)(c+L). These
results, illustrated in Fig. 2, are obtained also if L is greater than L* but smaller than (L*+c*-
c). Above this value, instead, the revenue loss from the immobile factors is not compensated





k(c+L)/(cc*)  1/2  t
Fig. 2: The Nash equilibrium with the small country undercutting the big one (t < t*).
48With  different  tax  rates  for  the  immobile  and  the  mobile  factor,  revenue
maximization  takes  place  separately  for  each  of  them.  Therefore,  the  tax  rate  on  the
immobile factor will be 100% in both countries; the tax rate on the mobile factor will be the
same as above, the only difference being that L does not appear in the maximization problem
and its solutions. In the set up of this model, harmonization would harm the small country if
it entails a common tax rate between the values chosen by the two countries in the Nash
equilibrium. One can improve the situation of both countries only by allowing their tax rates
to diverge. The way to do this is imposing a minimum rate such that, for the small country,
the loss in revenue due to the decrease in the differential between t and t* is more than offset
by the increase in revenue due to a higher tax rate  18,
18  For this  result in commodity  taxation  see Kanbur  and Keen  (1993).
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